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Abstract
Learning algorithm design for state-based games is investigated. A heuristic uncoupled learning algorithm, which is a two
memory better reply with inertia dynamics, is proposed. Under certain reasonable conditions it is proved that for any initial
state, if all agents in the state-based game follow the proposed learning algorithm, the action state pair converges almost surely
to an action invariant set of recurrent state equilibria. The design relies on global and local searches with finite memory, inertia,
and randomness. Finally, existence of time-efficient universal learning algorithm is studied. A class of state-based games is
presented to show that there is no universal learning algorithm converging to a recurrent state equilibrium.
Key words: Strategic learning, State-based games, Recurrent state equilibria, Multi-agent systems.
1 Introduction
Many systems, such as biological networks, social net-
works [1], and engineering systems [2], can be described
as a collection of interacting subsystems, which causes
local decisions using local information [3]. To ensure the
emergence of desirable collective behavior by designing
proper local control strategies is the core mission in such
systems. Game-theoretical method is becoming an ap-
pealing tool in control of the above systems as it provides
a modularized design architecture, i.e. the interaction
structure and learning algorithms can be designed sep-
arately [3],[4]. Some outstanding works include: (i) con-
sensus/synchronization of multi-agent systems [3]; (ii)
distributed optimization [5]; (iii) optimization in energy
[6] and transportation networks [7], just to name a few.
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State-based games, an extended model in game-theoretic
control, were proposed in [8]. In fact, the idea of state-
based games can be traced back to [9] (Section 9, Con-
clusion). Since then state-based games have shown their
strong vitality in many fields, such as achieving Pareto
optimality [10], realizing cooperative coverage in un-
known environment [11], and solving distributed eco-
nomic problem in smart grid [12]. Particularly, a com-
pletely uncoupled learning algorithm for general games
is designed for the first time using the theory of state-
based games and regular perturbed Markov chain [22].
Compared with traditional game-theoretical framework,
state-based games provide an additional degree of free-
dom, which is called state, to help coordinate group be-
havior. The underlying “state” has a variety of inter-
pretations ranging from a dummy agent [8] or external
environment [9] to real agents with unknown dynamics
or dynamics for equilibrium selection [13],[14]. Since the
additional degree of freedom is provided to help coor-
dinate group behavior, state-based game is a useful ex-
tended model in game-theoretic control.
One of the core challenges in applying state-based game
method to game-theoretic control is to design a strate-
gic learning algorithm which can converge to the equi-
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libria of state-based games. Although [8] proposed a fi-
nite memory learning algorithm for state-based poten-
tial games, to our best knowledge, there is no strategic
learning algorithm for general state-based games. The
purpose of this paper is to design a heuristic algorithm
for general state-based games.
The main contribution of this paper is the designed two
memory strategic learning algorithm for general state-
based games. The designed algorithm relies on global
and local searches using two memory information, in-
ertia, and randomness. Under certain reasonable condi-
tions it is proved that the algorithm converges almost
surely to a recurrent state equilibrium of state-based
games, which is a generalized Nash equilibrium. Finally,
to investigate the existence of universal learning algo-
rithm, a class of state-based games is presented, and for
such state-based games there is no universal learning al-
gorithm converging to a recurrent state equilibrium.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2
provides some preliminaries, including the formal defi-
nition of state-based games, recurrent state equilibrium,
state-based potential games, and the theory of learning
in state-based games. Section 3 focuses on the design of
a learning algorithm for general state-based games. Sec-
tion 4 considers the existence of a universal learning algo-
rithm. A brief conclusion is given in Section 5. Appendix
contains three parts. First part reveals the Markov chain
induced by the proposed learning algorithm. Some lem-
mas used in the proof of the convergence of the proposed
learning algorithm are provided in Second part. The con-
vergence of the proposed learning algorithm is proved in
last part.
2 Preliminaries
2.1 State-based games
Definition 1 [8] (State-based game) A finite state-
based game is a quintuple G = {N, {Ai}, {ci}, X, P},
where
(1) N = {1, 2, · · · , n} is the set of agents;
(2) Ai = {1, 2, · · · , ki} is the set of actions of agent i;
(3) ci : A × X → R is the payoff function of agent
i ∈ N , where A = ∏ni=1Ai is the action profile set,
and
∏
is the Cartesian product;
(4) X = {1, 2, · · · ,m} is the set of underlying finite
state;
(5) P : A ×X → ∆(X) is the Markovian state transi-
tion function, where ∆(X) denotes the set of prob-
ability distributions over the finite state space X.
When a state-based game is played repeatedly, a se-
quence of states
x(0), x(1), · · · , x(t), · · ·
and a sequence of joint actions
a(0), a(1), · · · , a(t), · · ·
are generated. [a(t), x(t)] ∈ A × X is referred to the
action state pair at time t. We give a rough description
on how the action state pair evolves. The sequence of
action profiles is produced using some specified decision
algorithm. Suppose the current state is x(t), and the
action taken by all agent at time t is a(t), then x(t+1) is
generated by the state transition function P (a(t), x(t)),
i. e., the ensuing state is selected randomly according to
the probability distribution P (a(t), x(t)). The dynamics
of state-based games can be described as in Fig. 1, where
‘’ signifies that the ensuing state x(k + 1) is selected
according to the probability distribution P (a(k), x(k)).
( )x t  1( ) ( ), , ( )na t a t a t   ( 1) ( ), ( )x t P a t x t  ( 1)x t 


Player i
Player 1
Player n
( )ia t
( )na t
1( )a t
Fig. 1. Dynamics of State-based Games
Denote by X(a|x) ⊆ X the set of reachable states start-
ing from initial state x driven by an invariant action a.
That is to say, a state y ∈ X(a|x) if and only if there
exists a time ty > 0 such that
Pr[x(ty) = y] > 0,
conditioned on the events x(0) = x and x(k + 1) 
P (a, x(k)) for all k ∈ {0, 1, · · · , ty − 1}. The transition
process can be illustrated as
x
a−→ x(1) a−→ a· · · a−→ x(ty − 1) a−→ x(ty) = y.
2
Remark 2 As pointed in [8] (Section 3.4), the model of
state-based games is a simplification of Markov games
[15]. In state-based games each agent is myopic (seeks
to optimize the current payoffs), while in markov games
every agent seeks to optimize a discounted sum of future
payoffs.
As a generalization of Nash equilibrium, the equilibrium
in state-based games is called the recurrent state equi-
librium (RSE).
Definition 3 [8] (Recurrent state equilibrium) Con-
sider a state-based game G = {N, {Ai}i∈N , {ci}i∈N , X, P} .
The action state pair [a∗, x∗] is a recurrent state equilib-
rium with respect to the state transition process P (·) if
the following two conditions are satisfied:
(1) The state x∗ satisfies x∗ ∈ X(a∗|x) for every state
x ∈ X(a∗|x∗);
(2) For each agent i ∈ N and every state x ∈ X(a∗|x∗),
ci(a
∗
i , a
∗
−i, x) > ci(ai, a∗−i, x), ∀ai ∈ Ai.
Denote P (a; ·, ·) the probability transition matrix of a
joint action a ∈ A in a state-based game G. The first
condition means that if the action state pair [a∗, x∗] is a
recurrent state equilibrium, thenX(a∗|x∗) is a recurrent
class of the Markov chain P (a∗; ·, ·) starting from the
initial state x∗. The second condition implies that a∗ is
a pure Nash equilibrium of state invariant game Gx =
{N,Ai, ci(·, x)} for every state x ∈ X(a∗|x∗).
Consider two action state pairs [a, x] and [b, y]. [a, x]
and [b, y] are called equivalent if the following three con-
ditions are satisfied: i) a = b, ii) [a, x] is a recurrent
state equilibrium, and iii) y ∈ X(a|x). Use the notation
[a, x] ∼ [b, y] to represent that [a, x] and [b, y] are equiv-
alent. Otherwise, it is denoted by [a, x]  [b, y]. It is easy
to verify that ∼ is an equivalence relation. Denote
R(a, x) :=
{
[a, y] : [a, y] ∼ [a, x]}.
We call R(a, x) a recurrent state equilibrium set gener-
ated by the recurrent state equilibrium [a, x].
Example 4 Consider the following state-based game
with N = {1, 2}, A1 = A2 = {1, 2}, X = {1, 2, 3}. The
game Gx is a coordination game, prisoner’s dilemma
game, and matching pennies game when x = 1, 2, and 3,
respectively. The payoff matrices are shown as follows.
Table 1
Payoff Bi-Matrix for x = 1 of Example 4 (coordination game)
Agent 1\Agent 2 1 2
1 (4, 4) (1, 3)
2 (3, 1) (2, 2)
Table 2
Payoff Bi-Matrix for x = 2 of Example 4 (prisoner’s dilemma
game)
Agent 1\Agent 2 1 2
1 (2, 2) (0, 3)
2 (3, 0) (1, 1)
Table 3
Payoff Bi-Matrix for x = 3 of Example 4 (matching pennies
game)
Agent 1\Agent 2 1 2
1 (−1, 1) (1, − 1)
2 (1, − 1) (−1, 1)
The state transition process is shown in Fig. 2.
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( 11, )P a   ( 12, )P a  
( 21, )P a   ( 22, )P a  
Fig. 2. State Transition Diagram of Example 4
One can verify that the recurrent states of Markov chain
P (a = 22, ·) is x = 1, x = 2, and a = 22 is a pure
Nash equilibrium when x = 1, 2. Therefore, action state
pair [a = 22, x = 1] and [a = 22, x = 2] both are the
recurrent state equilibria of Example 4, and [a = 22, x =
1] ∼ [a = 22, x = 2]. Although a = 11 is the pure Nash
equilibrium of G1, x = 1 is a transient state of Markov
chain P (a = 11, ·). So [a = 11, x = 1] is not a recurrent
state equilibrium.
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2.2 State-based potential games
State-based potential game, which is introduced by J. R.
Marden [8], can guarantee the existence of a recurrent
state equilibrium.
Definition 5 (State-based potential games)[8] A state-
based game G = {N, {Ai}, {ci}, X, P} is called a state-
based potential game if there exists a function φ : A ×
X → R such that for each action state pair [a, x] ∈ A×X,
the following two conditions are satisfied:
(1) For any agent i ∈ N and action a′i ∈ Ai
ci(a
′
i, a−i, x)− ci(a, x) = φ(a′i, a−i, x)− φ(a, x).
(2) For any state x′ in the support of P (a, x),
φ(a, x′) ≥ φ(a, x).
φ is called a potential function of the state-based potential
game, where a−i ∈ A−i :=
∏
j 6=iAj is the joint action
profile other than agent i.
The first condition means that every state invariant
gameGx = {N,Ai, ci(·, x)} is a potential game. The sec-
ond condition ensures that any action state pair which
maximizes the potential function is a recurrent state
equilibrium of the state-based potential game. Denote
by [a∗, x∗] the action state pair which maximizes the po-
tential function, i.e., [a∗, x∗] ∈ arg max[a,x]∈A×X φ(a, x).
Let R(a|x) be the recurrent states of the Markov chain
P (a, ·) starting from state x, which is by definition
nonempty. Obviously, R(a|x) ⊆ X(a|x). Therefore the
second condition of Definition 5 can be relaxed as:
(2) If [a∗, x∗] ∈ arg max[a,x]∈A×X φ(a, x), then [a∗, y] ∈
arg max[a,x]∈A×X φ(a, x) for every y ∈ R(a∗|x∗).
2.3 Learning in state-based games
Roughly speaking, learning in games is a decision-
making process using available information. The differ-
ence of learning algorithm between state-based games
and normal form games is that for the former there is
an additional factor, state, needed to be considered.
Consider a repeated state-based game. The observed se-
quence of agent i at time t is {{a(τ), x(τ)}τ=0,1,...,t−1, x(t)}.
Let Oi(t) denote the obtained/available information of
agent i at time t, that is,
Oi(t) :=
{ {a(τ), x(τ)}τ=0,1,...,t−1, x(t)}.
Generally speaking, the action updating mechanism of
agent i can be described by a response algorithm fi [16],
fi : Oi(t)→ ∆(Ai),
where fi is a function which maps agent i’s available
information Oi(t) to a probability distribution over i’s
own actions Ai. Agent i selects the action a(t+ 1) ∈ Ai
according to the probability distribution at time t + 1.
∆(Ai) denotes the set of probability distributions over
Ai.
According to the available information used in making
decisions, the most common learning algorithms can be
categorized as uncoupled learning algorithms and com-
pletely uncoupled learning algorithms, whose definition
are shown as follows.
Definition 6 [17] A learning algorithm is called
i) uncoupled if the available information of agent i used
for decision-making is the payoff structure of himself and
history sequence of the play, i.e.,
Oi(t) =
{ {a(τ), x(τ)}τ=0,1,...,t−1, x(t); ci(a, x)}.
ii) completely uncoupled if the available information of
agent i used for decision-making is his own past realized
payoffs and actions, i.e.,
Oi(t) =
{ {ai(τ), x(τ), ci(a(τ), x(τ))}τ=0,1,...,t−1, x(t)}.
Replicator dynamics [18], best-reply [19], and fictitious
play [20] are uncoupled learning algorithms. Regret
learning [21] and trial-and-error learning [22] are com-
pletely uncoupled learning algorithms.
The paper focuses on designing a natural and effec-
tive strategic learning algorithm which converges to re-
current state equilibrium of the state-based games. By
natural we require the algorithm being uncoupled or
completely uncoupled. By effective we mean that the
designed algorithm should converge to the equilibrium
heuristically, not be trapped in an adjustment cycle, and
not be predicted easily by each agent’s opponents.
4
3 A two-memory better reply learning algo-
rithm
3.1 Available information
Consider a repeated state-based game. Each agent seeks
to maximize its myopic payoff. Agent i knows his own
payoff function, but he doesn’t know his opponents’ ones.
He can observe current state x and his opponents’ ac-
tions a−i ∈ A−i, but the agent doesn’t know the struc-
ture of the Markovian state transition function P . Each
agent can recall the past 2-period information, i.e. 2-
memory, at each time. Denote by ξi(t) the information
used to make decision for agent i at time t ≥ 2
ξi(t) :=
{
a(t− 2), a(t− 1), x(t); ci(a, x)
}
.
Then the response algorithm fi of agent i has the fol-
lowing form
pi(t) = fi
(
ξi(t)
) ∈ ∆(Ai).
For any action state pair [a, x] ∈ A×X, agent i’s strict
better reply set is defined as
Bi(a;x) :=
{
a′i ∈ Ai : ci(a′i, a−i, x) > ci(a, x)
}
.
For simplicity, let Bi(t) := Bi(a(t− 1);x(t)), ∀t ≥ 1.
3.2 The flow of the two-memory better reply learning
algorithm
Suppose the information of the past two periods at time
t ≥ 2 is [a(t− 2), x(t− 1)]× [a(t− 1), x(t)] ∈ (A×X)×
(A×X). The response algorithm fi of agent i is defined
as follows:
(i) Check whether a(t− 2) = a(t− 1) or not at time t.
(ii) If a(t − 2) = a(t − 1). Then each agent calculates
Bi(t) and check whetherBi(t) = ∅ or not. IfBi(t) = ∅,
then agent i plays ai(t − 1) next moment. Otherwise
agent i selects actions according to a probability distri-
bution onAi, the support of which is {ai(t−1)}∪Bi(t).
Particularly, agent i selects ai(t− 1) with probability
i ∈ (0, 1), the inertia of agent i, and the actions in
Bi(t) with equal probability.
(iii) If a(t− 2) 6= a(t− 1), then all agents take actions
simultaneously according to their probability distri-
butions with full support. Particularly, agent i selects
ai(t−1) with probability i ∈ (0, 1), and other actions
in Bi(t) with equal probability.
Denote by paii (t) the probability that agent i selects ai ∈
Ai at time t. The detailed algorithm of the proposed
learning algorithm is shown in Algorithm 1.
Algorithm 1 . Two memory better reply learning algo-
rithm
Input: n, Ai, ci(a, x), X, P (x, a), i.
Output: Recurrent state equilibrium of G.
1: Initialization: Choose a initial state x(1) ∈ X ran-
domly. Set simulation time T ≥ 3.
2: for i = 1 : n do
3: paii (1) =
1
|Ai| ,∀ai ∈ Ai;
4: end for
5: x(2)  P (a(1), x(1));
6: for i = 1 : n do
7: paii (2) =
1
|Ai| ,∀ai ∈ Ai;
8: end for
9: x(3)  P (a(2), x(2));
10: for t = 3 : T do
11: if a(t− 2) = a(t− 1) then
12: for i = 1 : n do
13: if Bi(t) = ∅ then
14: ai(t) = ai(t− 1);
15: else
16: p
ai(t−1)
i (t) = i;
17: paii (t) =
1−i
|Bi(t)| ,∀ai ∈ Bi(t);
18: end if
19: end for
20: else
21: for i = 1 : n do
22: p
ai(t−1)
i (t) = i;
23: paii (t) =
1−i
|Ai|−1 ,∀ai ∈ Ai \ {ai(t− 1)};
24: end for
25: end if
26: x(t+ 1)  P (a(t), x(t));
27: end for
28: return
Remark 7 The proposed learning algorithm is a 2-
memory, stochastic learning algorithm with inertia i
for agent i. It is a combination of testing, searching,
and lock-in. Since the learning algorithm is 2-memory,
and every agent can can observe the opponents’ actions.
So each agents can tell whether a(t − 2) = a(t − 1) or
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not. This is testing. The searching process consists of
local search and global search. If a(t − 2) 6= a(t − 1),
then all agents take actions simultaneously according to
their probability distributions with full support. This is a
global stochastic search, both for agents and actions. If
a(t− 2) = a(t− 1) and Bi(t) 6= ∅, then agent i will take
actions from Bi(t). This is a local random search. If
a(t− 2) = a(t− 1) and [a(t− 2), x(t− 2)] is an RSE, all
agents will repeat their actions forever, which is called
lock-in.
Denote by h(t) := {a(t− 2), a(t− 1), x(t)} the past two
plays, t > 2. Then ξi(t) = {h(t); ci(a, x)}, i ∈ N. The
flow of the two-memory better reply learning algorithm
can be described as in Fig. 3.


Player i
Player 1
Player n
 1 1 1( ) ( )a t f t
 ( 1) ( ), ( )x t P a t x t  ( ) ( )i i ia t f t
 ( ) ( )n n na t f t
( )a t ( 1)h t ( )h t
Fig. 3. Dynamics of State-based Games
3.3 Convergence of the proposed learning algorithm
Consider a state-based game G = {N, {Ai}, {ci}, X, P}.
Let
P¯ (·, ·) := 1|A|
∑
a∈A
P (a; ·, ·),
and we know that P¯ (·, ·) ∈ R|X|×|X| is row stochastic.
Then a Markov chain is defined by P¯ with X as its state
space. Suppose G has at least one RSE, and let
A∗ = {a ∈ A|there exists a state x, s.t. [a, x] is a RSE}.
For a ∈ A∗, denote
X(a) := {x ∈ X : ∃x∗ ∈ X(a|x), s.t. [a, x∗] is an RSE}.
The set X(a),∀a ∈ A∗ contains all states from which
the algorithm can reach an RSE class of action a with
positive probability by only adopting the same action a.
Let X∗ :=
⋃
a∈A∗ X(a) ⊆ X.
Theorem 8 Consider a state-based game G = {N, {Ai},
{ci}, X, P}, where the recurrent state equilibria exist.
Suppose that either X \X∗ = ∅, or X \X∗ 6= ∅ and the
following assumptions hold:
(i) For every recurrent class R¯ of P¯ , there exists an
action a∗ ∈ A and a state x∗ ∈ R¯ such that [a∗, x∗] is
an RSE.
(ii) P (a;x, x) > 0 for all a ∈ A and x ∈ X \X∗.
Then for any initial state x0 ∈ X, if all agents play the
game G by the proposed two memory better reply learning
algorithm, the action state pair converges almost surely
to an action invariant set of recurrent state equilibria.
Conditions (i) and (ii) of Theorem 8 guarantee that there
exists a positive probability “path” which leads any ini-
tial action state pair to an RSE. The proof of Theorem
8 is presented in the Appendix.
The following example shows that the assumption (ii)
of Theorems 7 avoids the situation where some desired
actions cannot be selected according to the learning al-
gorithm.
Example 9 Consider the following state-based game
with N = {1, 2}, A1 = A2 = {C,D}, X = {1, 2, 3, 4},
and A = {CC,CD,DC,DD}. The payoff bi-matrices
are shown in Table 4-Table 7.
Table 4
Payoff Bi-Matrix for x = 1 of Example 9
Agent 1\Agent 2 C D
C (5, 4) (2, 3)
D (4, 2) (3, 1)
Table 5
Payoff Bi-Matrix for x = 2 of Example 9
Agent 1\Agent 2 C D
C (1, 2) (3, 1)
D (2, 0) (2, 1)
Table 6
Payoff Bi-Matrix for x = 3 of Example 9
Agent 1\Agent 2 C D
C (−1, 1) (1,−1)
D (1,−1) (−1, 1)
Table 7
Payoff Bi-Matrix for x = 4 of Example 9
Agent 1\Agent 2 C D
C (2, 2) (2, 3)
D (0, 3) (3, 1)
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The Markovian state transition matrices are as follows:
P (CC; ·, ·) =

1 0 0 0
0 1 0 0
0 12
1
2 0
0 0 12
1
2

, P (CD; ·, ·) =

1 0 0 0
1
2
1
2 0 0
0 0 0 1
0 0 0 1

,
P (DC; ·, ·) =

1
2
1
2 0 0
0 0 0 1
0 0 0 1
0 0 0 1

, P (DD; ·, ·) =

1 0 0 0
0 12 0
1
2
0 0 0 1
0 0 0 1

.
It can be observed that the only RSE is (CC, 1). Suppose
that x(0) = 4, and the only possible choice of actions such
that the system leaves the state 4 and reaches the state 2 is
adopting CC twice. This is because a(0) must be CC and
x(1) = 3 with probability 1/2. Although a(1) can be any
action in A, actions CD, DC, and DD make the system
return to the state 4. Therefore, a(1) should be CC too,
and x(2) = 2 with probability 1/2 on the condition that
x(1) = 3.
However, since B1(CC, 2) = {D} and B2(CC, 2) = ∅,
the algorithm can only select actions from set {CC,DC}
at time t = 2. The choice CC makes the state of the sys-
tem stay at 2, while the latter makes x(3) = 4, and every-
thing returns to the beginning. Thus, the algorithm can-
not reach the RSE from the initial state x(0) = 4, though
P¯ is irreducible, and the assumptions (i) of Theorem 8
holds.
4 Existence of universal time-efficient learning
algorithm
4.1 Time efficiency
One may be interested in the complexity of the proposed
learning algorithm, especially the time efficiency. The
time efficiency of a learning algorithm is defined as fol-
lows:
Definition 10 [17] A learning algorithm is called time
efficient if the time for the algorithm to converge to an
equilibrium is polynominal with respect to the number of
agents.
[23] proved that there does not exist any time-efficient
uncoupled learning algorithm that converges to a pure
Nash equilibrium for generic normal form games where
such an equilibrium exists. As state-based games contain
normal form games as its special case, we can conclude
that:
Proposition 11 There does not exist any time-efficient
uncoupled learning algorithms that converge to a recur-
rent state equilibrium for general state-based games where
such an equilibrium exists.
4.2 A counter example
In fact, when it comes to state-based games, things be-
come a bit more complicated. There is even no universal
learning algorithm converging to a recurrent state equi-
librium. We present the following example.
Example 12 Consider the following state-based game
with N = {1, 2}, A1 = A2 = {1, 2}, X = {1, 2, 3, 4}.
The payoff matrices are shown in Table 8-Table 11.
Table 8
Payoff Bi-Matrix for x = 1 of Example 12
Agent 1\Agent 2 1 2
1 (5, 4) (2, 3)
2 (4, 2) (3, 1)
Table 9
Payoff Bi-Matrix for x = 2 of Example 12
Agent 1\Agent 2 1 2
1 (2, 2) (3, 1)
2 (0, 3) (2, 1)
Table 10
Payoff Bi-Matrix for x = 3 of Example 12
Agent 1\Agent 2 1 2
1 (−1, 1) (1, − 1)
2 (1, − 1) (−1, 1)
The Markov transition matrices under different actions
7
Table 11
Payoff Bi-Matrix for x = 4 of Example 12
Agent 1\Agent 2 1 2
1 (2, 2) (2, 3)
2 (0, 3) (3, 1)
have the following form:
P (a; ·, ·) =

p11(a), p12(a), 0, 0
p21(a), p22(a), 0, 0
0, 0, p33(a), p34(a)
0, 0, p43(a), p44(a)

,
where 0 < pij(a) < 1 is the probability that state i trans-
fers to state j, ∀a ∈ {11, 12, 21, 22}.
It is obvious that action state pair [a = 11, x = 1] and
[a = 11, x = 2] are RSEs. For any learning algorithms,
once the process enters action state pair [a, x = 3] or
[a, x = 4], it cannot escape from such an action state pair.
Therefore, there does not exist any learning algorithms
that converge to a recurrent state equilibrium in such
state-based games.
According to Example 12, the following claim is obvious.
Proposition 13 If for all Markov chain P (a; ·, ·),∀a ∈
A, there exists a common closed set, denoted by Xc ⊆ X,
s.t., such that, for all x ∈ Xc and a ∈ A, [a, x] is not an
RSE. Then there does not exist any uncoupled learning
algorithm that converge to an RSE for generic state-based
games even if such an equilibrium exists.
The reason why there does not exist such learning algo-
rithms is that for a given state-based game the dynamic
of the stateP (a; ·, ·) is pre-given, which is uncontrollable.
5 Conclusion
An extended model in game theory, called state-based
games, is investigated in this paper. An uncoupled two
memory learning algorithm is proposed. We proved that
under certain reasonable conditions the proposed learn-
ing algorithm converges to a recurrent state equilibrium
of a state-based games. Since an additional degree of
freedom is provided to help coordinate group behavior,
state-based game is an useful extended model in game-
theoretic control. The existence of time-efficient univer-
sal learning algorithm is also investigated. A numerical
example is presented to show that there is even no uni-
versal learning algorithm converging to a recurrent state
equilibrium. Future works will focus on the applications
of the state-based game model and the learning algo-
rithm to engineering control problems.
Appendix
A The proposed algorithm and corresponding
Markov chain
The proposed 2-memory learning algorithm defines a
discrete-time Markov chain {ω(t), t ≥ 0} with finite
state space Ω := X × A × X × A × X, where ω(t) =
[x(t), a(t), x(t+ 1), a(t+ 1), x(t+ 2)]T , t ≥ 0.
Let xi ∈ X and ai ∈ A be the state and action at time i,
respectively. The initial distribution of the Markov chain
{ω(t)} is
Pr
{
ω(0) = [x0, a0, x1, a1, x2]T
}
=
(∏
1≤i≤n
1
|Ai|
)2
p(x0)P(a0;x0, x1)P(a1;x1, x2),
where p : X → [0, 1] is the probability distribution of for
initial state. For the sake of simplification, suppose the
inertia of agent i is the same, i.e.,  = i.
Consider any two states ω1, ω2 ∈ Ω of the Markov
chain {ω(t)}, where ω1 = [x1, a1, x2, a2, x3]T and
ω2 = [y
1, b1, y2, b2, y3]T . According to the learning al-
gorithm, the transition probability from ω1 to ω2 of the
Markov chain {ω(t)} is as follows:
(1) If [y1, b1, y2] 6= [x2, a2, x3], then
Pr {ω(t+ 1) = ω2|ω(t) = ω1} = 0.
(2) If [y1, b1, y2] = [x2, a2, x3] and a1 6= a2, then
Pr {ω(t+ 1) = ω2|ω(t) = ω1}
= n−|H(b
1,b2)| ·
∏
i∈H
1− 
|Ai| − 1 · P(b
2; y2, y3),
where H(a, b) := {i ∈ N : ai 6= bi}, a, b ∈ A.
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(3) If [y1, b1, y2] = [x2, a2, x3] and a1 = a2, then
Pr {ω(t+ 1) = ω2|ω(t) = ω1}
= n−|H(b
1,b2)|−|N(b1,y2)| × P(b2; y2, y3)
×
∏
i∈H
1− 
|Bi(b1, y2)|IBi(b1,y2)((b
2)i),
where N(a, x) := {i ∈ N : Bi(a, x) = ∅}, and
IBi(a,x)(bi) is an indicator function such that
IBi(a,x)(bi) = 1 if bi ∈ Bi(a, x) and IBi(a,x)(bi) = 0
if bi /∈ Bi(a, x), a ∈ A, x ∈ X, bi ∈ Ai.
B Some lemmas used in proof of Theorem 7
Denote D(a, x) := {b ∈ A : bi ∈ Bi(a, x) ∪ {ai}, i ∈ N}
as the collection of action vectors whose entries are strict
better reply actions for a and x or entries of a. From
the definition, we know that {a} ⊆ D(a, x) ⊆ A for any
a ∈ A and x ∈ X.
Lemma 14 Consider a state-based game, where the
RSE exists. For any fixed initial value x(0) = x0 and
fixed action-state pairs (a0, x1), (a1, x2) of the learning
algorithm, if there exists a positive integer K ≥ 2 and a
sequence of action-state pairs {(ai, xi+1), 2 ≤ i ≤ K},
where ai ∈ A, xi+1 ∈ X, 2 ≤ i ≤ K, such that
(i) P (a2;x2, x3)P (a3;x3, x4) · · ·P (aK ;xK , xK+1) > 0;
(ii) if ak−1 = ak for some integer k ∈ [1,K), then
ak+1 ∈ D(ak, xk+1);
(iii) (aK , xK+1) is an RSE,
then the algorithm converges to some RSE almost surely,
by which we mean that P{τ < ∞} = 1, where τ :=
min{t ≥ 2 : (at, x(t+1)) is an RSE }, and, at the same
time, that a(τ+t) = aτ , x(τ+t) ∈ X(aτ |x(τ+1)) for t ≥ 1.
Proof: For convenience, let
ω(t) := [xt, at, xt+1, at+1, xt+2]T ,∀t ≥ 0,
unless elsewhere stated. The assumptions imply that, for
any fixed initial state ω(0) = [x0, a0, x1, a1, x2]T ,
Pr{ω(K − 1)|ω(0)} > 0.
From the transition probability of {ω(t)} and that
(aK , xK+1) is an RSE, it follows that
Pr{ω(K + 1) = [xK+1, aK , xK+2, aK , xK+3]T
|ω(K − 1) = [xK−1, aK−1, xK , aK , xK+1]T } > 0,
where xK+2, xK+3 ∈ X(aK |xK+1).
Thus,
Pr{ω(K + 1) = [xK+1, aK , xK+2, aK , xK+3]T
|ω(0) = [x0, a0, x1, a1, x2]T } > 0,
Therefore, the algorithm can reach an RSE from any
state ω(0) ∈ Ω with positive probability. 2
Lemma 15 Suppose that the following assumptions
hold:
(i) P¯ is irreducible;
(ii) there exists an action a∗ ∈ A and a state x∗ ∈ X
such that (a∗, x∗) is an RSE;
(iii) P (a;x, x) > 0 for all a ∈ A and x ∈ X.
Then for any initial state x ∈ X, the algorithm converges
to some RSE class a.s.
Proof: It suffices to validate the conditions in Lemma 14
hold.
(i) For any fixed initial state [x0, a0, x1, a1, x2], if a0 6=
a1, and (a1, x2) is an RSE, then the desired sequence
of action-state pairs is obtained when we let a2 = a1.
If x2 ∈ X(a∗|x∗), then let a2 = a∗, and the desired
sequence is obtained too.
Now assume that a0 6= a1, that (a1, x2) is not an RSE,
and that x2 6∈ X(a∗|x∗). From assumption (i), it follows
that, for x2 ∈ X, there exists a positive integer K1 ≥ 3
such that
P¯ (x2, x3)P¯ (x3, x4) · · · P¯ (xK1−1, xK1) > 0,
where xi 6= x∗, 2 ≤ i < K1, and xK1 = x∗. The defini-
tion of P¯ implies that there exists a sequence of action-
state pairs {(ai, xi+1), 2 ≤ i < K1} such that
P (a2;x2, x3)P (a3;x3, x4) · · ·P (aK1−1;xK1−1, x∗) > 0,
where xi 6= x∗, 2 ≤ i < K1. Let aK1 = a∗.
Without loss of generality, suppose that (ai, xi+1) is
not an RSE for all 2 ≤ i < K1. Otherwise let K˜1 :=
min{2 ≤ i < K1 : (ai, xi+1) is an RSE} and consider
the sequence {(ai, xi+1), 0 ≤ i ≤ K˜1}.
Suppose that there exists some integer k ∈ [1,K1) such
that ak−1 = ak but ak+1 6∈ D(ak, xk+1). Denote kˆ :=
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1 + max{t ∈ [0, k − 1) : at 6= ak−1}. The assumption
a0 6= a1 implies that kˆ ≥ 1. Insert an action a˜i 6= ai
between ai and ai+1, kˆ ≤ i < k. In fact, a˜i, kˆ ≤ i < k,
can be the same action vector. Assumption (iii) ensures
that
P (akˆ;xkˆ, xkˆ+1)P (a˜kˆ;xkˆ+1, xkˆ+1)P (akˆ+1;xkˆ+1, xkˆ+2) · · ·
P (ak−1;xk−1, xk)P (a˜k−1;xk, xk)P (ak;xk, xk+1) > 0.
The condition (ii) in Lemma 14 is satisfied for this new
sequence of action-state pairs, and the desired sequence
is obtained in this way.
(ii) If a0 = a1, and (a1, x2) is an RSE, then let a2 = a1
and x3 ∈ X(a1|x2).
(iii) If a0 = a1, but (a1, x2) is not an RSE, then, accord-
ing to the learning rule, one can choose a2 6= a1. By ap-
plying the argument above to (x1, a1, x2, a2, x3), we can
obtain the desired sequence of action-state pairs. 2
Lemma 16 Suppose that the following assumptions
hold:
(i) for every recurrent class R¯ of P¯ , there exists an action
a∗ ∈ A and a state x∗ ∈ R¯ such that (a∗, x∗) is an RSE;
(ii) P (a;x, x) > 0 for all a ∈ A and x ∈ X.
Then for any initial state x ∈ X, the algorithm converges
to some RSE class a.s.
Proof: From the proof of Lemma 15, it suffices to show
that the conditions in Lemma 14 still hold when a0 6= a1,
and x2 is a transient state of P¯ . If there exists an action
a∗ ∈ A such that (a∗, x2) is an RSE, then let a2 = a∗
and the desired sequence is obtained. Otherwise, since
x2 is transient for P¯ , we know that there exists a positive
integer K1 ≥ 3 and a recurrent state of P¯ , x˜, such that
P¯ (x2, x3)P¯ (x3, x4) · · · P¯ (xK1−1, xK1) > 0,
where xi 6= x˜, 2 ≤ i < K1; xK1 = x˜; (a˜, x˜) is an RSE for
some a˜ ∈ A. The definition of P¯ implies that there exists
a sequence of action-state pairs {(ai, xi+1), 2 ≤ i < K1}
such that
P (a2;x2, x3)P (a3;x3, x4) · · ·P (aK1−1;xK1−1, x˜) > 0,
where xi 6= x˜, 2 ≤ i < K1. Let aK1 = a˜.
We can obtain the desired sequence by applying the same
argument in Lemma 15. 2
C The proof of Theorem 7
Proof: Before proving the theorem, we point out the fol-
lowing facts: if
(a) the action state pair [a(t), x(t)] is a RSE,
(b) the action a(t) is repeated for the next time, i.e.
a(t+ 1) = a(t),
(c) all agents use the proposed learning algorithm,
then for ∀t′ > t + 1, [a(t′), x(t′)] will be a RSE and
a(t′) = a(t).Therefore according to Lemma 14, the proof
of Theorem 8 is equivalent to proving the following state-
ments: for any action state pair [a(t), x(t)],∀t > 0, there
exists a finite timesteps T > 0 and a positive probabil-
ity ρ ∈ (0, 1] such that [a(t+ T ), x(t+ T )] is a RSE and
a(t+ T ) = a(t+ T + 1) with at least probability ρ > 0.
Denote by S := (A × X) × (A × X). Split S into four
disjoint parts:
S1 :=
{
[a, x]× [b, y] ∈ S : [a, x] ∼ [b, y]};
S2 :=
{
[a, x]× [b, y] ∈ S : [a, x]  [b, y] and [b, y] is a
RSE
}
;
S3 :=
{
[a, x]× [b, y] ∈ S : [a, x]  [b, y], [b, y] is not a
RSE, and a 6= b};
S4 :=
{
[a, x]× [b, y] ∈ S : [a, x]  [b, y], [b, y] is not a
RSE, and a = b
}
.
Before starting the proof, we suppose i = , ∀i ∈ N.
This assumption will not affect the results.
Case 1: Suppose the play of the past two periods at time
t > 2 is [a(t− 2), x(t− 1)]× [a(t− 1), x(t)] ∈ S1. Then
there exists a recurrent state equilibrium setR(a, x) such
that [a(t−2), x(t−1)]×[a(t−1), x(t)] ∈ R(a, x)×R(a, x).
It follows that a(t − 2) = a(t − 1) = a. According to
the proposed learning algorithm, for any t′ ≥ t, [a(t′) =
a, x(t′ + 1)] is a RSE, and we are done.
Case 2: Suppose [a(t−2), x(t−1)]× [a(t−1), x(t)] ∈ S2.
Denote by
S12 :=
{
[a, x]× [b, y] ∈ S2 : a = b
}
,
S22 :=
{
[a, x]× [b, y] ∈ S2 : a 6= b
}
.
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• If [a(t−2), x(t−1)]×[a(t−1), x(t)] ∈ S12 , then accord-
ing to condition (i) of the proposed learning algorithm,
all agent will take a(t − 1) at time t with probability
1. So the action state pair [a(t) = a(t− 1), x(t+ 1)] is
a RSE. Therefore [a(t−1), x(t)]× [a(t), x(t+1)] ∈ S1.
According to the above argument, we are done.
• If [a(t − 2), x(t − 1)] × [a(t − 1), x(t)] ∈ S22 , then ac-
cording to condition (ii) of the proposed learning algo-
rithm, all agent will take action simultaneously. The
probability of a(t) = a(t− 1) is at least n. Hence the
probability of [a(t−1), x(t)]× [a(t), x(t+1)] transfers
into S1 after 2 steps with at least probability 
n.
Once [a(t − 1), x(t)] × [a(t), x(t + 1)] transfers into S1,
it will stay in a recurrent state equilibrium set R(a, x)
forever.
Case 3: Suppose [a(t−2), x(t−1)]× [a(t−1), x(t)] ∈ S3.
Let [a∗, x∗] be an RSE of G. According to algorithm (ii)
of the proposed learning algorithm, all agents will take
action simultaneously. The probability of a(t) = a∗ is
δ1 = 
n−|H(a(t−1),a∗)| ∏
ij∈H
1− 
|Aij | − 1
> 0,
where H(a(t− 1), a∗) = {i : ai(t− 1) 6= a∗i }.
• If x(t + 1) = x′ ∈ X(a∗|x∗). Denote by γ1 > 0 the
probability that x(t)→ x(t+1) = x′ under the action
a∗. Then [a(t−1), x(t)]× [a(t), x(t+ 1)] transfers into
S2 with probability δ1 · γ1 > 0.
• If x(t+1) /∈ X(a∗|x∗). (i) If X \X∗ = ∅. According to
the definition of X∗, we know that there exists an ac-
tion a such that [a, x(t)] is an RSE. As a(t−2) 6= a(t−
1), according to the learning algorithm the probabil-
ity of a(t) = a is positive. And x(t+1) ∈ X(a(t)|x(t)).
The probability of a(t) = a is
δ2 = 
n−|H(a(t−1),a)| ∏
ij∈H
1− 
|Aij | − 1
> 0,
where H(a(t − 1), a) = {i : ai(t − 1) 6= ai}. Then
[a(t − 1), x(t)] × [a(t) = a, x(t + 1] transfers into S2
with probability δ2 · P (a;x(t), x(t + 1)) > 0. (ii) If
X \X∗ 6= ∅, and there exists an action b ∈ A∗, such
that x(t) ∈ X(b). As a(t− 2) 6= a(t− 1), according to
the learning algorithm, let a(t) = b. According to the
definition, we know that there exists a finite integer
K > 0 and a state x ∈ X such that
x(t)
b−→ b· · · b−→ x(t+K) ∈ X(b|x), (C.1)
where (b, x) is an RSE. Then [a(t+K − 1) = b, x(t+
K)]×[a(t+K) = b, x(t+K+1)] transfers into S2 with
probability nK · δ3 ·P (b;x(t+K), x(t+K + 1)) > 0,
where
δ3 = 
n−|H(a(t+K−2),b)| ∏
ij∈H
1− 
|Aij | − 1
> 0.
(iii) If X \X∗ 6= ∅, and x(t) /∈ X∗. From the proof of
Lemma 15 and Lemma 16, we know that there exists
a positive integer K1 ≥ 0 and a recurrent state x˜ of
P¯ , such that
P¯ (x(t), x(t+ 1)) · · · P¯ (x(t+K1 − 1), x(t+K1)) > 0,
where x(t+ τ) /∈ X∗, 0 ≤ τ < K1, x(t+K1) = x˜ and
x˜ ∈ X(a˜) for some a˜ ∈ A∗. Moreover, the definition of
P¯ implies that there exists a sequence of action-state
pairs {(a(t+ τ), x(t+ τ + 1)), 0 ≤ τ < K1} such that
P (a(t);x(t), x(t+ 1))P (a(t+ 1);x(t+ 1), x(t+ 2))
· · ·P (a(t+K1 − 1);x(t+K1 − 1), x˜) > 0,
where x(t + τ) /∈ X∗, 0 ≤ τ < K1, and x˜ ∈ X(a˜) for
some a˜ ∈ A∗. Assumption (ii) in Theorem 7 ensures
that by applying the same argument as in Lemma 15
and Lemma 16, with a slight abusement of notations,
we can obtain a sequence of action-state pairs {(a(t+
τ), x(t+τ+1)), 0 ≤ τ ≤ K1}, which satisfy the all the
conditions in Lemma 14. Using the same arguments
in above condition (ii), there exists a a finite integer
K2 > 0, such that
[a(t+K1 +K2 − 1), x(t+K1 +K2)]
× [a(t+K1 +K2), x(t+K1 +K2 + 1)]
transfers into S2 with positive probability.
According to the arguments in Case 2, we can conclude
that any state in S3 will transfer into S1 with a positive
probability after finite steps.
Case 4: Suppose [a(t−2), x(t−1)]× [a(t−1), x(t)] ∈ S4.
Let [a∗, x∗] be an RSE of G.
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• If a(t − 1) = a∗, according to the arguments in Case
3, we can conclude that
[a(t− 1) = a∗, x(t)]× [a(t) = a∗, x(t+ 1)]
will transfer into S1 will a positive probability after
finite steps. Similar with the arguments in Case 2,
the probability that [a(t − 1), x(t)] × [a(t), x(t + 1)]
transfers into S2 is at least δ2 · γ3 · nm > 0.
• If a(t − 1) 6= a∗, there must be an agent i ∈ N with
an action a′i ∈ Ai for some state x′ ∈ X(a(t− 1)|x(t))
such that
ci(a
′
i, a−i(t− 1), x′) > ci(a(t− 1), x′).
Otherwise, a(t− 1) = a∗. Since x′ ∈ X(a(t− 1)|x(t)),
there exists a time t′ ∈ {t+1, . . . , t+m+1} such that
Pr[x(t′) = x′] > θ > 0 (C.2)
conditioned on the events x(t), a(t − 1) = a(t) =
· · · = a(t′−1). The above events happen with at least
probability θ · nm. Denote by a′ = (a′i, a−i(t− 1)). If
(a′, x′) is an RSE. Then
[a(t′ − 1) = a(t− 1), x(t)]× [a′, x′]
transfers into S2. Notice that a
′ 6= a(t′ − 1). If (a′, x′)
is not an RSE,
[a(t′ − 1) = a(t− 1), x(t)]× [a′, x′]
transfers into S3. According to the arguments in Case
2 and Case 3, we can conclude that any state in S4
will transfer into S1 will a positive probability after
finite steps.
Summarizing Case 1, Case 2, Case 3 and Case 4, we
conclude that for any fixed initial state x(0) and any
action state pair [a(t), x(t + 1)],∀t > 0, there exists a
finite time T such that [a(t+T ), x(t+T + 1)] is an RSE
and a(t+ T ) = a(t+ T + 1) with a positive probability.
2
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